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COMMENTARY
JULES GERARD*
I would like to begin by making two comments, the first directed at
Mr. Days' language argument. I was struck to hear him refer a couple
of times to the past history of discrimination with the phrase "rectifying
past wrongs," which in a literal sense obviously cannot be done. If it
can be done at all, it can be done only in the sense of precluding recur-
rence. So, we have a language problem there, too.
I also want to comment on Professor Glazer's discussion of the Pow-
ell opinion in Bakke and the time in which to implement it. In retro-
spect, most people have agreed that the "all deliberate speed" formula
of Brown v. Board of Education' was a very big mistake. It would have
been better had the Court in Brown just announced what the Constitu-
tion required and let nature take its course, as is customary following
judicial decisions. I have a problem with this idea of temporizing in
Bakke. If "all deliberate speed" was a mistake in Brown, I wonder
whether it might not also be a mistake in Bakke.
Finally, I should like to raise a problem that was not discussed by
any of our speakers. I think it is implicit, and borders on being explicit,
in everything they said. We have pending in Missouri right now-and
it is not the first case of this kind in the country-a lawsuit that argues
that the Bar Examination is administered in an unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory manner because it disqualifies or fails a disproportionate
number of minorities.' This has to do with Professor Glazer's statisti-
cal justice discussion and also to what he referred to as the "in-and-out"
argument. I do not share, at least if I understand it, Dean Griswold's
apparent optimism that we can avoid deadening absolute egalitarian-
ism. The thing that concerns me about the Bar Examination is that the
whole law school enterprise is founded upon the idea that, at some time
in the past, our lawyers were not as good as they should have been, and
we needed some other method of training than the one we had then. I
wonder, if challenges to Bar Examinations are going to be decided on
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the same basis as other questions for which statistical arguments are
used, whether we are not sooner or later going to undercut the whole
justification for professional schools in this country.
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